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V. CONCLUSION: IN A GALAXY NOT TOO FAR AWAY?
I. INTRODUCTION
The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) is the primary federal statute
governing millions of arbitration agreements that have mushroomed in every
nook and cranny of modem American society.' It is no secret, and a
tremendous embarrassment, that the Supreme Court of the United States has
grossly erred when construing and applying the FAA in a long series of cases
spanning the last few decades, and these flawed decisions have encouraged
this explosion of arbitration agreements across America. As admitted by some
Justices, "the Court has abandoned all pretense of ascertaining congressional
intent with respect to the [FAA], building instead, case by case, an edifice of
its own creation."2 Through these flawed decisions, the Court has shifted the
foundations of the entire civil legal system and barricaded the courthouse
doors, at both the federal and state levels, in a way never intended by Congress.
In its most recent FAA decision from December 2015, DIRECTV, Inc. v.
Imburgia, the Supreme Court continued its awkward tradition of issuing
preposterous FAA rulings. The Court's DIRECTV decision is defective on
many levels. For example, although the FAA was never intended to apply in
state courts, 4 the Court in DIRECTV applied the FAA to a state court
proceeding.5 Furthermore, although the FAA was designed to facilitate the
arbitration of contractual claims and never intended to cover the arbitration of
statutory claims, 6 the Court in DIRECTV used the FAA to compel arbitration
' Arbitration, General Provisions, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2016); Jessica Silver-Greenberg
& Robert Gebeloff, Arbitration Everywhere, Stacking the Deck of Justice, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 1, 2015, at Al.
2 Allied-Bruce Terminix Companies, Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 283 (1995)
(O'Connor, J., concurring); id at 285 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("I will, however, stand ready
to join four other Justices in overruling [the Court's flawed FAA ruling in Southland, Inc.
v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984)], since Southland will not become more correct over
time..."). See also DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463, 478 (2015) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting, joined by Sotomayor, J.).
3 DIRECTV, 136 S. Ct. at 467-71.
4 IAN R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW: REFORMATION, NATIONALIZATION,
INTERNATIONALIZATION 122-23 (1992).
5 DIRECTV, 136 S. Ct. at 466 ("We here consider a California court's refusal to
enforce an arbitration provision in a contract. In our view, that decision does not rest 'upon
such grounds as exist... for the revocation of any contract,' and we consequently set that
judgment aside.").
6 Compare 9 U.S.C. § 2 (declaring that written provisions in a contract "to settle by
arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract" are fully enforceable)
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of critical statutory claims designed to protect consumers. 7 The Court has
increasingly painted itself into a smaller and smaller comer each time it issues
a new, flawed FAA decision building upon the shaky foundation of the its
prior glaring errors in this field. However, the Court in DIRECTV reached a
new low, a result so extreme and "dangerous," according to the dissenting
Justices, 8 that the Court's DIRECTVdecision turns arbitration law completely
upside down.
This Article explores the Supreme Court's tortured and strained
interpretation of the FAA in its recent DIRECTV decision. As demonstrated
below, the Court's flawed decision uses a "Jedi Mind Trick" to turn arbitration
law upside down.9 The Court's decision desecrates the most fundamental
principle of arbitration law, that arbitration must be based on the agreement of
the parties. 10 The Court overrides and alters the intent of the parties in this
case, as well as the intent of Congress in enacting the FAA.
The first part of this Article explains the background of the DIRECTV case
and summarizes the Court's ruling. The second part of the Article closely
examines the deep, multiple flaws in the DIRECTV opinion. Finally, the
Article concludes by addressing how DIRECTV's holding applies to some
common hypotheticals in order to demonstrate the broader impact of this
case in shutting off access to America's civil justice system.
(emphasis added), with Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473
U.S. 614, 625 (1985) (expanding the FAA to cover statutory claims, but omitting the
critical qualifying phrase "arising out of such contract" from the Court's quotation of 9
U.S.C. § 2).
7 DIRECTV, 136 S. Ct. at 471 (underlying claims involved California consumer
protection legislation).
8 Id. at 473 (Ginsburg J., dissenting, joined by Sotomayor, J.).
9 STAR WARS: EPISODE IV - A NEW HOPE (20th Century Fox 1977) (where Obi-Wan
Kenobi overrides the minds of imperial stormtroopers by making them believe that the
droids in Obi-Wan's possession "aren't the droids [the stormtroopers are] looking for" by
using a Jedi Mind Trick); STAR WARS: EPISODE VI - RETURN OF THE JEDI (20th Century
Fox 1983) (describing Luke Skywalker's power to manipulate others, Jabba the Hutt first
used the phrase "Jedi Mind Trick" in the third installment of the Star Wars movie although
a Jedi Mind Trick first occurred in the original Star Wars movie). The Court's reasoning
in DIRECTV can be compared to a Jedi Mind Trick because the Court overrides and alters
the intent of the parties in this case as well as the intent of Congress in enacting the FAA.
"0 Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 682 (2010) ("Whether
enforcing an agreement to arbitrate or construing an arbitration clause, courts and
arbitrators must give effect to the contractual rights and expectations of the parties. In this
endeavor, as with any other contract, the parties' intentions control. This is because an
arbitrator derives his or her powers from the parties' agreement...") (citations and internal
quotations omitted); First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943 (1995)
("[A]rbitration is simply a matter of contract between the parties.") (citations omitted).
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II. A LONG TIME AGO, IN A GALAXY FAR, FAR AWAY ... (BEFORE THE
COURT'S DECISION IN AT&T MOBILITY LLC v. CONcEPcIoN"l )
Before critiquing the Supreme Court's decision, this section of the Article
provides some background. Below is an overview of some facts and issues of
the DIRECTV case, as well as a summary of the trial court's, appellate court's,
and Supreme Court's decisions.
DIRECTV is a broadcast satellite service provider of television
entertainment in the United States, with more than twenty million customers.
12
Based on DIRECTV's marketing practices, the Federal Trade Commission
charged DIRECTV in 2015 with false and misleading advertisements. 13
DIRECTV service agreements typically require a mandatory two-year
obligation, subject to certain early termination fees. 14 However, instead of
focusing on this two-year obligation, many DIRECT advertisements feature a
low, "teaser" monthly rate, which is in effect just for the first twelve months
of the contract. 15 These low "teaser" rates result in a discounted first year for
the contract, and prices for customers significantly increase by sometimes as
much as 50 to 70% for the second year of the contract. 16 Also, if a customer
cancels the service before the two-year contract expires, DIRECTV charges
the customer cancellation fees of up to $480.17
DIRECTV's failure in its ads to clearly and prominently disclose the two-
year contractual obligation, the price jump in the second year, and the
substantial cancellation fees form the basis for the Federal Trade
Commission's government action against the company. 18 These practices of
DIRECTV also form the basis for the private plaintiffs' class action lawsuits
filed against the company, which led to the Supreme Court's decision.
19
u 563 U.S. 333 (2011).
12 UNITED STATES SECURITIES EXCHANGE COMMISSION, ANNUAL REPORT
PURSUANT TO SECTION 13 OR 15(D) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT 2 (2014).
13 Complaint at 8-9, Federal Trade Commission v. DIRECTV, No. 3:15-cv-01129





18 See generally id
19 DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463, 471 (2015).
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In 2007, DIRECTV's service agreement sent to its customers contained a
binding arbitration clause. 20 This arbitration clause, like many arbitration
clauses of today, contained a class action waiver stating that "[n]either you nor
we shall be entitled to join or consolidate claims in arbitration."21 DIRECTV's
contract also contained an anti-severability or "blow-up" clause stating that if
the "law of your state" makes the class action waiver unenforceable, then the
entire arbitration agreement is unenforceable. 22 At the time the 2007 contract
was entered into, some courts were invalidating class action waivers pursuant
to state law. 23 The "law of your state" blowup clause helped ensure that if a
court invalidated DIRECTV's class action waiver, the case would proceed in
court instead of as a class arbitration.
24
20 Id. at 466.
21 Id. See also CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, ARBITRATION STUDY, REPORT TO
CONGRESS, PURSUANT TO DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER
PROTECTION ACT § 1028(A), at 10, 46 (2015) (The Bureau, in its landmark report to
Congress regarding the use of arbitration in connection with financial services and products
sold to consumers, found that "[n]early all the arbitration clauses studied include
provisions stating that arbitration may not proceed on a class basis." Just like DIRECTV's
arbitration clause at issue in this case, most of the clauses studied by the Bureau contained
an anti-severability clause providing that if the class action waiver is held unenforceable,
then the entire arbitration clause is also unenforceable.).
22 DIRECTV, 136 S. Ct. at 466.
23 Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100 (2005), abrogated by AT&T
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011).
24 Another benefit for DIRECTV in drafting a contract providing for state law to
govern is that a state-by-state analysis can be used to frustrate the certification of a
nationwide class. It is important to recognize this is a nationwide contract and not used
solely in California; the effect of DIRECTV's terms is to incorporate the laws of each of
the fifty different states, depending on where a customer is located. Imagine a hypothetical
situation where DIRECTV's agreement did not contain a blowup clause, and suppose that
a customer files a nationwide class action in court on behalf of customers in every state.
Without DIRECTV's blowup clause and its direction to engage in a state-by-state analysis
of the enforceability of the class waiver, there is a risk that a court in one state may apply
its own state's laws to invalidate the class waivers for an entire nationwide class of
DIRECTV's customers. For example, if a nationwide class action is filed in California, a
California court may apply California law and invalidate the class waivers for the entire
nationwide class,for every customer in every state. After such a sweeping invalidation of
the class waivers for an entire nationwide class based on the laws of only one state, perhaps
class proceedings could potentially occur consisting of a nationwide class of all DIRECTV
customers. By including the blowup clause requiring an individualized, state-by-state
analysis of the enforceability of the class waiver provision, DIRECTV ensures that if a
customer files a nationwide class action in court, a court would not sweepingly invalidate
the class waiver for the entire nationwide class based on the laws of just one state. As a
result of the blowup clause with its state-by-state analysis, arbitration will generally be
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In 2008, DIRECTV's customers filed class action proceedings in state
court alleging that DIRECTV had violated California laws through its early
termination fees.2 5 At the time the litigation began, the Supreme Court had
not issued its landmark decision in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, which
preempted a state law which in effect invalidated class action waivers and
imposed class procedures on an arbitration proceeding. 26 DIRECTV,
believing the class action waiver would not be enforceable under California
law and the arbitration clause would thus not be enforceable through the
blowup clause, did not ask the trial court to enforce the arbitration clause at
first.2 7 However, three years into the litigation, after the Supreme Court issued
its Concepcion decision in 2011, DIRECTV asked the trial court to enforce
the arbitration agreements and order the plaintiffs to pursue their claims
individually in arbitration.
2 8
Taking a look at the bigger picture and beyond the special issues of
arbitration law in this case, what is really at stake with this fight that went all
the way to the Supreme Court is whether the claims will proceed individually
in arbitration, or instead in court, where the possibility of a class action exists.
compelled on an individual basis in states whose laws permit class waivers. But if a court
finds that a class waiver is not allowed under a particular state's laws, the blowup clause
providing for a state-by-state analysis would invalidate the arbitration clause just in that
one state, and most importantly not for the entire country, and the case could perhaps
proceed as a statewide class, but not automatically as a nationwide class. By incorporating
a state-by-state analysis in its contract, DIRECTV helps ensure that at most, there are small,
state-by-state explosions or invalidations of the class waiver, instead of a large-scale
invalidation of the class waiver for the entire country. By incorporating the "law of [each
customer's] state" in the blowup clause, DIRECTV made a calculated choice to provide
for a state-by-state analysis of its class waiver, which in turn helps thwart the possibility
of certification of an expansive nationwide class. See, e.g., Hill v. T-Mobile USA, Inc.,
2011 WL 10958888, at * 18 (N.D. Ala. May 16, 2011) ("Plaintiffs have also failed to factor
in the varying impact that class action waivers, agreements to arbitrate, and challenges to
such provisions' contractual enforceability as a matter of state law will have on the
predominance inquiry (in connection with a purported nationwide class).") (emphasis
added); Cohen v. DirecTV, Inc., 2007 WL 5314555 (Cal. Super. Ct. Nov. 15, 2007)
("Where a state by state analysis of an arbitration provision's enforceability would be
required to certify a nationwide class, predominance does not exist and the nationwide
class should not be certified.") (emphasis added and citation omitted), aff'd, 101 Cal. Rep.
3d 37 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009).
21 DIRECTV, 136 S. Ct. at 466.
26 Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333.
27 Brief for Petitioner at 7-8, DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463 (2015) (No.
14-462), 2015 WL 3505225 (May 29, 2015).
2" Imburgia v. DIRECTV, Inc., No. BC398295, 2012 WL 7657788 (Cal. Super. Feb.
26, 2012).
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This case is part of a larger battle and debate in American society about the
role of class actions in our legal system, with large corporate interests who
desire to end class actions pitted against consumer and employee rights groups
who tend to favor the availability of class mechanisms.
29
A. Episode I.- Trial Court's Order Denying Arbitration
In a brief decision with minimal analysis, the trial court refused to enforce
DIRECTV's arbitration clause. 30  The trial court acknowledged that the
Supreme Court's Concepcion decision had invalidated California's Discover
Bank rule, which was ajudge-made rule that generally invalidated class action
waivers in consumer contracts.31 However, the trial court reasoned that the
Concepcion decision was distinguishable and did not address FAA preemption
of a state statute prohibiting waivers of statutory representative actions.3 2 The
trial court found that California's Consumers Legal Remedies Act (CLRA),
which was the basis for some of the plaintiffs' claims, does not permit the
waiver of the right to bring a collective action.33 The trial court compared
CLRA claims to claims under California's Private Attorney General Act, and
the court recognized that both types of claims authorize public injunctive relief
for the benefit of the general public, not just the individual plaintiff.34 The
trial court believed such claims could be subject to arbitration under the
FAA.35
B. Episode IT. Appellate Court's Decision Denying Arbitration and
Concluding "State Law" Really Means "State Law "
The appellate court affirmed the trial court's refusal to enforce the
arbitration clause. Citing Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees
of Leland Stanford Junior University,3 6 the appellate court understood that
parties can agree for state law to govern an arbitration clause, and the appellate
court then turned to the issue of whether the parties here had agreed to adopt
29 Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Robert Gebeloff, Arbitration Everywhere, Stacking the
Deck of Justice, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2015, at Al.






36 Volt Info. Sci., Inc., v. Bd. of Tr. of Leland Stanford Jr. Univ., 489 U.S. 468 (1989).
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state law.37 Focusing on the phrase "law of your state," the appellate court
reasoned this phrase could have two possible meanings: 1) California law,
without considering the preemptive effect, if any, of the FAA; or 2) California
law, taking into account the preemptive effect of the FAA.38 To resolve this
problem of interpretation, the court relied on several general principles of
contract interpretation under state law. First, the appellate court reasoned that
specific contract provisions trump more general contract provisions when the
terms are inconsistent.39 Applying this reasoning, the appellate court found
the specific reference to "state law" governing the enforceability of the class
action waiver trumped the more general reference in the contract that the FAA
governed the arbitration clause. 40 Also, the appellate court relied on the
general contract interpretation principle that ambiguities are resolved against
the drafter.41 The appellate court also recognized that DIRECTV in other parts
of its arbitration agreement had similarly incorporated state law with respect
to the issue of judicial review of arbitral awards.42 The appellate court found
that the phrase "law of your state" was intended by the parties to mean
California law, without considering the preemptive effect of the FAA. 43 As a
result, because the class action waiver was not enforceable under California
law, the appellate court held that DIRECTV's blowup clause invalidated the
entirety of the arbitration agreement. 44
C. Episode III. Reversal by the Supreme Court of the United States
The Supreme Court, in a 6-2-1 vote, reversed the appellate court's
decision and remanded for further proceedings. Justice Breyer wrote the
majority opinion, finding that the FAA preempts the appellate court's
interpretation of the contract. 45 Before engaging in an analysis of the legal
issues, the majority issued an unusual, stem warning. Justice Breyer's
majority opinion declared that Concepcion-a decision where Justice Breyer
was among the dissenters when it was issued in 2011-is the law of the land,
and pursuant to the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, judges of every
17 Imburgia v. DIRECTV, Inc., 225 Cal. App. 4th 338, 342-43 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014).
38 Id. at 343-44.
39 1d. at 344.
40 Id.
4 1 Id. at 345.
421d. at 344 n.2.
43 Id. at 344.
44 Id. at 347.
45 DIRECTV, 136 S. Ct. at 465-71.
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state must follow it, even if they believe the decision is wrong.46 To help set
the stage for his analysis, the majority then agreed with the appellate decision
below that the FAA gives parties "considerable latitude" to elect state law to
govern some or all of its arbitration agreement, and in theory, parties can agree
to have portions of their contract governed by "the law of Tibet, the law of
pre-revolutionary Russia, or (as is relevant here) the law of California
including the Discover Bank rule and irrespective of that rule's invalidation in
Concepcion."47 The majority then recognized that the appellate court had
interpreted "law of your state" to mean California law, irrespective of the
FAA's preemptive powers, and the majority cited Volt and acknowledged that
state court interpretations of a contract's terms pursuant state contract law are
owed deference.48 As a result, the majority explained that the issue in this
case is not whether the appellate court's interpretation is correct, but whether
the appellate court's interpretation is consistent with the FAA.49 The majority
acknowledged that the state court was the "ultimate authority" on interpreting
a contract under state law,50 but nevertheless, the majority concluded that "the
Court of Appeal's interpretation is pre-empted by the Federal Arbitration
Act."
51
Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justice Sotomayor, wrote a strong dissenting
opinion. The dissent believed the appellate court correctly applied traditional
contract law principles, including the principle that ambiguities are resolved
against a drafter, to properly interpret the arbitration clause as referring
exclusively to state law, without the preemptive effect of the FAA.52
Justice Thomas wrote a separate dissenting opinion based on his long-held




47 AT&T Mobility LLC. v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 468 (2011).
48 Id.
49 Id.
" Id. ("Although we may doubt that the Court of Appeal has correctly interpreted
California law, we recognize that California courts are the ultimate authority on that law.").
51 d. at 471.
52 Id. at 471-78.
13Id. at 471.
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
III. THE SUPREME COURT'S JEDI MIND TRICK THAT TURNS
ARBITRATION LAW UPSIDE DOWN
A. California: The Wild, Wild West or Tatooine54 of Arbitration Law
To provide a broader context for this case, it is helpful to examine some
of the statements made by the majority Justices during oral argument of this
DIRECTV case. Based on oral argument, it is clear the Justices mistrust the
California courts on arbitration issues. It appears that the majority of Justices
think of California as the lawless wild west of arbitration law.
During oral argument Justice Breyer asked a hypothetical question which
was revealing about his views of this case. During oral argument, he inquired
what would happen if a contract clearly stated "do not turn on the light," but a
state court disingenuously interpreted this language to mean "turn on all the
lights."55 It appears the majority thought that the language in the contract was
so clear that the California appellate court in effect was disingenuously
interpreting the word "up" to mean "down."
Based on his questions during oral argument, Justice Breyer appears to
have conceptualized the lower court's decision as displaying hostility and
discrimination against arbitration through thinly-veiled, superficial arguments
purportedly based on general contract principles. The majority's belief that
the lower court engaged in disguised hostility helps explain the unusual and
stem judicial smackdown at the beginning of the majority's analysis, where
the majority warns that lower courts must follow the Supreme Court's lead,
even if they believe the Supreme Court is wrong.
56
Based on oral argument, it seems apparent that the majority wanted to
reverse the appellate court's decision. Why? The majority appeared to believe
that the appellate court's interpretation was wrong and disingenuous.
However, this belief cannotjustify a reversal. It would not be appropriate for
5 Tatooine is the desolate, remote, desert planet where Luke Skywalker lived in the
first Star Wars movie. STAR WARs: EPISODE IV - A NEW HOPE (20th Century Fox 1977).
" Oral Argument at 4, DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463 (2015) (No. 14-
462). During oral argument, it appears Justice Breyer was trying to suggest that the
California courts, which were using neutral, state contract law principles to discriminate
against arbitration agreements, were behaving like the Southern states during the civil
rights movement, when Southern states convicted African-American demonstrators who
were engaging in sit-ins at lunch counters. Oral Argument at 18. Although these state
convictions appeared at first glance to be facially neutral and based on state laws like
trespass or breach of peace, it was obvious the state convictions were racially motivated.
See, e.g., Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244 (1963).56 DIRECTV, 136 S. Ct. at 468.
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the Justices to strike down the appellate court's decision on the grounds that
the state court's interpretation was incorrect under state law. 57 Justice Breyer
admitted during oral argument that the Supreme Court does not have that
power to say the appellate court's interpretation was wrong.58 As the majority
recognized in its decision, state courts are the "ultimate authority" on
interpreting contracts under state law. 59 The Justices in the majority were very
careful to stress that they were treating the state court's interpretation as
correct under state law:
[W]e must decide not whether its decision is a correct statement of
California law but whether (assuming it is) that state law is consistent
with the Federal Arbitration Act.... Although we may doubt that the
Court of Appeal has correctly interpreted California law, we recognize
that California courts are the ultimate authority on that law.
60
The majority Justices appeared to believe the appellate court's decision was
simply wrong, but they had to respect the state court's interpretation as correct
and authoritative under state law. What justification did the Justices concoct
to trump the state court's authoritative interpretation under state law? The
Justices relied on FAA preemption: "[T]he Court of Appeal's interpretation is
pre-empted by the Federal Arbitration Act." 61 But as explained below,
preemption in this context turns arbitration law upside-down.
B. The FAA Strikes Back: How the Supreme Court Expanded FAA
Preemption in DIRECTV and Violated the Most Fundamental
Principle ofArbitration Law
Since the 1980s, the Supreme Court has assisted corporate America with
docket-clearing by bestowing the FAA with some very impressive
intergalactic Death Star powers capable of destroying state laws. For example,
in a franchise dispute involving the 7/11 convenience store chain, the Supreme
Court held in 1984 that the FAA applied in state courts and preempted a state
law requiring ajudicial forum for franchise disputes. 62 But the FAA was never
57 
Id.
58 Oral Argument at 4, DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463 (2015).




62 Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 17 (1984).
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intended to apply in state courts. 6 3 Similarly, over the years, the Supreme
Court has held that the FAA preempted a state law banning arbitration of
personal injury claims against nursing homes, 64 a state law imposing special
notice requirements for arbitration clauses, 65 a state law banning the
enforcement of pre-dispute arbitration agreements, 66 a state law banning
arbitration of wage claims, 67 a state law banning class action waivers, 68 and a
state law granting primary jurisdiction to an administrative agency to resolve
disputes.
6 9
Every prior FAA case, where the Supreme Court has found preemption
exists, involved the FAA preemption of a state law. 70 However, in its
DIRECTV decision, the Supreme Court goes much further and steps off the
deep end. In DIRECTV, the Supreme Court holds that the FAA preempts the
parties' agreement, as correctly interpreted by the state court under state
contract law.7 1 However, preemption of an agreement is an absurd result and
violates the most fundamental principle of arbitration law: that arbitration law
is a matter of agreement. 72 The power of the arbitrator, the legitimacy of the
arbitrator's award, the constitutionality of the arbitration process, and all of
arbitration law is based firmly (or was based firmly until DIRECTV) on the
foundational principle that arbitration is a matter of agreement between the
parties. 73 Like the Force in Star Wars, the agreement of the parties binds the
galaxy of arbitration together.
63 See generally MACNEIL, supra note 4.
6 Marmet Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, 132 S. Ct. 1201, 1204 (2012).
65 Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 688 (1996).
66 Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 281 (1995).
67 Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492 (1987).
68 AT&T Mobility LLC. v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 351-52 (2011).
69 Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 362-63 (2008).
70 See supra notes 61, 63-68 and accompanying text.
7'DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463, 471 (2015).
72 First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943 (1995) ("[A]rbitration
is simply a matter of contract between the parties; it is a way to resolve those disputes-
but only those disputes-that the parties have agreed to submit to arbitration."). See also
H.R. REP. No. 68-96, at 1 (1924) ("Arbitration agreements are purely matters of contract,
and the effect of [the FAA] is simply to make the contracting party live up to his
agreement.").
7 Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 682 (2010) ("Whether
enforcing an agreement to arbitrate or construing an arbitration clause, courts and
arbitrators must give effect to the contractual rights and expectations of the parties. In this
endeavor, as with any other contract, the parties' intentions control. This is because an
arbitrator derives his or her powers from the parties' agreement....") (citations and internal
quotations omitted).
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Pursuant to the Supreme Court's flawed FAA jurisprudence since the
1980s, the FAA can be expected to override a state law. 74 However, the FAA
should not override the parties' agreement. The FAA should instead respect
the parties' agreement. The majority treats the lower court's interpretation of
the contract as correct and authoritative, 75 but nevertheless, the FAA trumps
the agreement of the parties.76 This flawed rationale can best be described as
a "Jedi Mind Trick." Under the state court's authoritative and correct analysis
interpreting the contractual terms, the parties agreed to incorporate state law,
but at the same time, the majority, in effect, says the parties did not really agree
to that state law because the FAA preempts this agreement and forces the
parties to arbitrate. 77 This preemption of the parties' agreement turns
arbitration law upside-down. After DIRECTV, nothing can stand in the way
of FAA preemption, not a state law and (absurdly) not even the parties'
agreement. As correctly pointed out by Justice Ginsburg in her dissent, the
majority took a "dangerous first" step with its strange and unprecedented
preemption analysis.
78
Justice Ginsburg, in her strong dissent, recognized that FAA preemption
is unusual and does not operate in the same way as traditional preemption.
79
For example, a federal labor law would easily preempt a conflicting state labor
law. 80 However, "FAA preemption cannot occur without reference to a
particular agreement of the parties." 81 In other words, all the Supreme Court's
prior FAA preemption decisions cannot be disconnected from the particular
arbitration agreements at issue in those cases. For example, in the Supreme
Court's Preston v. Ferrer case, which is the high-water mark for FAA
preemption because the Court held that the FAA preempts a state law granting
primary jurisdiction to an administrative agency, it is critical to remember that
the clause at issue was a broad arbitration clause where the parties bargained
that all disputes between the parties would be resolved through arbitration.
82
" See, e.g., Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 17 (1984).
71 DIRECTV, 136 S. Ct. at 468.
76 Id. at 471.
71 Id. Compare Obi-Wan Kenobi's Jedi Mind Trick ("these aren't the droids you're
looking for"), STAR WARS: EPISODE IV - A NEW HOPE (20th Century Fox 1977), with
DIRECTV, 136 S. Ct. at 471 (although the parties agreed to incorporate state law, as
authoritatively interpreted by the state court, this is not the law the parties are looking for
because of FAA preemption).
78 DIRECTV, 136 S. Ct. at 473.
79 Id. at 473 n. 1.
80 Id.
81 Id. (quoting Brief for Law Professors as Amicus Curiae).
82 Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 361-63 (2008).
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In Preston, Justice Ginsburg, who wrote the majority opinion,
appropriately recognized the supremacy of the parties' agreement in
arbitration law and in FAA preemption analysis. In Preston, the Supreme
Court emphasized that the "dispositive issue" in the case is "not whether the
FAA preempts [state law] wholesale" because in the abstract, the "FAA
plainly has no such destructive aim or effect." 83 It is important to remember
that the FAA does not preempt anything in the abstract on its own. There must
be an agreement to arbitrate before FAA preemption could apply, and the
scope of the parties' agreement could impact the preemption analysis. It was
critical for the Preston Court to examine and acknowledge the parties'
particular agreement at issue, which should be the foundation for all
arbitration. The Preston Court found that where parties agree broadly to
arbitrate all disputes between them, the FAA supersedes a state law requiring
a dispute to be heard in an administrative agency. 84 The Preston Court
appropriately recognized that FAA preemption cannot take place without
consideration of the parties' agreement.
Suppose that the agreement between the artist and entertainment lawyer
in Preston were rewritten to contain the following hypothetical terms:
Any claim arising out of this agreement shall be settled by arbitration.
However, if the law of your state requires that such claims be heard in
a judicial or administrative forum, this arbitration agreement is not
enforceable.
It seems clear that if the artist's state required an administrative or judicial
hearing for the dispute at issue in Preston, this hypothetical arbitration
agreement would not be enforceable due to the bargained-for terms of the
parties' agreement. In Preston, if the parties had agreed to incorporate such a
state law requiring an administrative or judicial hearing, then the FAA would
not have preempted the state law. The Supreme Court's FAA preemption
cases must be analyzed together with the clauses at issue in those cases.
Consider a hypothetical twist to the Supreme Court's infamous Southland
v. Keating case,85 which is one of the biggest errors in the Court's history-
but that's another story. 86 In Southland, the Court held that the FAA preempts
a state law requiring courts to resolve franchising disputes. 87 However, it is
83 Id. at 353 (emphasis added).
84 Id. at 349-50.
85 Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
86 See generally MACNEIL, supra note 4.
87 Southland, 465 U.S. at 16.
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critical to remember that the parties in Southland had bargained for a broad
arbitration clause requiring all disputes to be arbitrated. 88 By bargaining for a
clause broadly covering all disputes, the parties opted out of the state law
requiring a judicial forum for franchise disputes. But suppose that the
franchisor and franchisee in Southland had bargained for a different, narrower,
hypothetical clause in their franchise agreement as follows:
Any claim arising out of this agreement
shall be settled by arbitration. However, if
the law of your state prohibits the arbitration
of such claims between a franchisee and
franchisor, this arbitration agreement is not
enforceable.
With this narrower hypothetical clause, the Southland decision would have
turned out differently. If a franchisee's state required courts or an
administrative agency to resolve franchise disputes, and if there was a clause
such as the hypothetical one above, then there would be no obligation to
arbitrate.
Why would a national franchisor draft such an exclusion in their
arbitration agreement? There are many reasons. Perhaps a state may have a
better developed administrative government agency with its own specialized
rules for resolving franchise disputes. In such states, the parties would forego
arbitration to take advantage of the special government tribunals. However,
in other states that do not have a specially designed administrative system for
handling franchise disputes, the parties agree to arbitrate. It is not really
important why the parties chose this exclusion. 89 What is important is that if
88 Id. at4.
'9 There could be several other reasons why parties may bargain for application of
state law in connection with an arbitration agreement. For example, state law may have
special features not available through the FAA, and the ability to incorporate such features
may make arbitration more attractive to parties. Hall Street Assocs., LLC v. Mattel, Inc.,
552 U.S. 576, 590 (2008) (although the FAA does not provide for expandedjudicial review
of awards, parties can agree to incorporate "state statutory or common law" permitting a
completely different level ofjudicial review). Parties may also choose state law to govern
arbitration clauses due to reputational concerns. For example, if a state has a strong policy
favoring a judicial or administrative forum for consumer or employment claims, a
company or employer may be willing to forgo arbitration in that state to promote a good
reputation with employees or consumers in that state and to avoid the perception of
undermining state policies. Also, a company or employer may willingly choose to submit
to state policies to maintain a good reputation with state government officials or regulators,
who may have the power to grant benefits in other matters. Concern about one's reputation
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the parties bargained for such an exclusion, the FAA should respect this choice
and party autonomy.
The Supreme Court's landmark ruling in Concepcion is known for its
impact; the ruling in effect allows the elimination of class actions through the
use of an arbitration clause.90 Focusing on the legal issues in Concepcion, one
sees that this impact or result of ruling is brought about through the doctrine
of FAA preemption and the interplay between a particular contract, the FAA,
and state law. In Concepcion, the Court held that the FAA preempts
California's Discover Bank rule, which invalidated class action waivers.
91
However, it is critical to remember that the arbitration agreement in
Concepcion was broadly drafted and covered all disputes between the
parties.
92
Suppose that the cellular telephone contract at issue in Concepcion were
rewritten to contain the following hypothetical terms:
Any claim arising out of this agreement shall be settled by arbitration.
There shall be no right to any class or representative proceedings in
arbitration (the "class waiver"). However, if the law of your state
invalidates this class waiver, this arbitration agreement is not
enforceable.
Similar to the above hypothetical twists to Preston and Southland, it seems
clear that if the law of a customer's state invalidates judicial and arbitral class
among members of the public and government officials due to the use of arbitration clauses
is not far-fetched. For example, in 2014, General Mills suddenly reversed its adoption of
an arbitration clause just a few days after its implementation because of strong criticisms
from the public and government officials. Sen. Menendez Urges FTC to Intervene on
Behalf of General Mills Customers, Apr. 17, 2014,
http://www.menendez.senate.gov/news-and-events/press/sen-menendez-urges-ftc-to-
intervene-on-behalf-of-general-mills-customers; Stephanie Strom, General Mills Reverses
Itself on Consumers' Right to Sue, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2014, at A17. These are many
possible reasons and benefits why parties may bargain for application of state law in
connection with an arbitration agreement, but the reasons are not particularly important. If
the parties agreed to incorporate state law in connection with arbitration, the FAA should
respect the parties' agreement, the foundation of all arbitration.
90 See, e.g., Jean R. Stemlight, Tsunami: AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion Impedes
Access to Justice, 90 OR. L. REV. 703,704 (2012) (discussing the Supreme Court's decision
on arbitration clauses is interpreted by lower courts and may harm employees and
consumers).
91 AT&T Mobility LLC. v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 352 (2011) ("California's
Discover Bank rule is preempted by the FAA.").
9 21 d. at 336.
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waivers, then the arbitration clause would be unenforceable for customers in
that state, not because of the state law, but because the parties bargained for
application of that law, even though the FAA may displace such a state law
under a broad clause. Concepcion recognized that parties could agree to class
arbitration, if they chose to do so, but the obligation to engage in class
arbitration cannot be manufactured by law and instead must arise from the
consent of the parties.93 Thus, if the parties explicitly agree to class arbitration,
or if the parties indirectly accomplish the same result through an agreement to
incorporate a state law imposing class procedures, the FAA should respect the
party's choice to engage in class arbitration.
In these above hypothetical twists to Preston, Southland, and Concepcion,
if the FAA broadly preempted the parties' choice of state laws, such
preemption would violate the cardinal principle of arbitration law-
"arbitration is simply a matter of contract." 94 With these hypotheticals where
parties limit their agreement by incorporating state law, it is important to
remember that state law is not frustrating the purpose of the FAA in such
situations; instead, the parties' agreement is limiting the obligation to arbitrate,
just like the parties bargained for. Arbitration law is supposed to operate in a
manner that respects the wishes of the parties.
It is critical to recognize that FAA preemption does not involve solely two
factors, the FAA and state law, like other common preemption analyses.
95
Instead, FAA preemption analysis involves the interplay of three factors: state
law, the FAA, and the particular agreement at issue between the parties, the
foundation of all arbitration.
The Supreme Court in DIRECTV seems to have forgotten about the
primacy of the agreement of the parties. The majority treats the lower court's
interpretation of the contract as correct and authoritative, but nevertheless, the
FAA preempts this agreement of the parties. After DIRECTV, nothing stands
in the way of the FAA's intergalactic superpowers, not even the parties'
agreement-the foundation of all arbitration. The Court's overriding of the
parties' arbitration agreement crossed the Rubicon and entered "dangerous"
territory.
96
" Id. at 348 ("[C]lass arbitration, to the extent it is manufactured by Discover Bank
rather than consensual, is inconsistent with the FAA") (emphasis added).
4 First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943 (1995).
9 See, e.g., PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567 (2011) (federal law preempted
state law).
96 DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463, 473 (2015) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting,
joined by Sotomayor, J.).
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C. Aiming Like a Stormtrooper: How DIRECTV's Preemption
Standard Misses the Mark
97
Another reason the DIRECTV decision is flawed is that the preemption
standard used by the Court is unreasonable, has nothing to do with protecting
the fundamental attributes of arbitration, and is inconsistent with the history
of the FAA's enactment.
The Supreme Court in DIRECTV adopted an "equal footing" preemption
analysis for interpretation of arbitration agreements. The Supreme Court
reasoned that the FAA preempted the appellate court's interpretation because
"California courts would not interpret contracts other than arbitration contracts
the same way," and "nothing in the Court of Appeal's reasoning suggests that
a California court would reach the same interpretation of 'law of your state'
in any context other than arbitration."
98
This equal footing preemption analysis from DIRECTV is very different
from the FAA preemption analysis used by the Court in Concepcion, which
involved a "fundamental attributes" preemption test. 99 In Concepcion, the
state law at issue required the imposition of class procedures. 100 The Court in
Concepcion held that the FAA preempted this state law because the forced
imposition of class procedures interfered with fundamental attributes of
arbitration.
101
I am not a fan of the impact of Concepcion.10 2 But at least Concepcion's
fundamental attributes test can be justified as focused on protecting the
integrity and fundamental attributes of arbitration. In other words,
Concepcion's fundamental attributes preemption test is more tailored to
arbitration. But requiring equal interpretations for all contracts does not really
protect the fundamental attributes of arbitration in any way. Such a test merely
" Especially in the original Star Wars trilogy, in virtually every battle involving
stormtroopers, the stormtroopers are notorious for having marksmanship so poor it is
comedic. Stormtroopers seem to always miss their mark. They wildly fire their weapons,
but miss slow-moving targets just a few feet away.98 D1RECTV, 136 S. Ct. at 469 (emphasis added).
9 Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 344 (2011) ("Requiring the availability of class wide
arbitration interferes with fundamental attributes of arbitration and thus creates a scheme
inconsistent with the FAA.").
100Id.
101 Id.
102 See generally lmre S. Szalai, More Than Class Action Killers: The Impact of
Concepcion and American Express on Employment Arbitration, 35 BERK. J. EMP. & LAB.
L. 31 (2014) (observing that Concepcion threatens to have a destabilizing effect on the
legal framework supporting individual arbitration proceedings in the United States).
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ensures that we interpret language "in the same way" in different contexts. 
103
But this goal of equal interpretation can be separated from arbitration; equal
interpretation has nothing to do with the fundamental attributes of arbitration.
Why is it necessary for equality with interpreting terms across the board in all
types of contracts? For example, consider the phrase "reasonable time," which
can appear in all types of contracts across a wide variety of industries.10 4 Why
does this phrase "reasonable time" have to be interpreted the same way in all
types of contracts? The same phrase may mean different things in different
settings across time, and there is nothing wrong with such diversity of
meaning.
Also, requiring equality in interpretation of contract terms across all types
of contracts is unreasonable because arbitration agreements have certain
unique features that do not easily carry over into other contexts. For example,
suppose an arbitration agreement contains an ambiguous phrase regarding the
selection of an arbitrator. Language regarding the selection of an arbitration
will not exist in other non-arbitration contexts, and thus searching for how
courts interpret arbitrator-selection language in a non-arbitration context does
not make much sense. An arbitration contract is not comparable to a shipping
contract for the delivery of corn, or a residential lease, or a contract for gym
membership. Arbitration contracts have unique features that may not readily
appear in other settings, and thus the "equal interpretation" preemption
standard is not reasonable.
In sum, DIRECTV's preemption standard misses the mark in several ways.
The standard is unreasonable and has nothing to do with protecting the
fundamental attributes of arbitration.
D. A Jar Jar Binksian Failure: DIRECTV's Preemption Standard
Has No Basis in the Text or History of the FAA
10 5
The equal interpretation preemption analysis also has no basis in the text
or history of the FAA. The Court incorrectly framed the interpretation issue
103 DIRECTV, 136 S. Ct. at 469 (finding preemption of parties' contract because
"California courts would not interpret contracts other than arbitration contracts the same
way") (emphasis added).
104 See, e.g., GATX Logistics, Inc. v. Lowe's Cos., 548 S.E.2d 193 (N.C. Ct. App.
2001) (concluding that meaning of the phrase "reasonable time" in a warehousing
agreement is ajury issue); Williams v. Coe, 417 So. 2d 426 (La. Ct. App. 1982) (construing
the term "reasonable time" in a purchase agreement involving real estate).
"'S Jar Jar Binks, an alien who appeared in STAR WARs: EPISODE I - THE PHANTOM
MENACE (20th Century Fox 1999), is generally regarded as a failure or low point in the
Star Wars movies. He has been called the "the most reviled character in the Star Wars
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as involving the savings clause of Section 2, but the savings clause does not
deal with interpretation issues. At the very beginning of the opinion, where
the Court frames the issue for the entire case, the Court quotes the savings
clause of Section 2 of the FAA. 106 Although arbitration agreements are
generally "valid, irrevocable, and enforceable" according to Section 2 of the
FAA, the savings clause at the very end of Section 2 provides that arbitration
agreements may be revoked for "such grounds as exist at law or in equity for
the revocation of any contract." 10 7 The Court then summarizes its conclusion
by stating that the lower court's "decision does not rest 'upon such grounds as
exist...for the revocation of any contract,' and we consequently set that
judgment aside."' 0 8 At the end of the opinion, the Court concludes that "[t]he
Court of Appeal's interpretation [of the contractual language] is pre-empted
by the Federal Arbitration Act." 109 By framing the problem at the very
beginning of its analysis as whether the savings clause is satisfied, the
Supreme Court is concluding that the appellate court's interpretation fails to
satisfy the savings clause. Unfortunately, the text of the savings clause does
not justify the equal interpretation preemption standard.
The text of the savings clause of Section 2 of the FAA deals with defenses
for the "revocation of any contract," 110 not interpretation issues. The savings
clause permits application of generally applicable contract law defenses, like
fraud or duress, to revoke the entire contract. Under the savings clause,
application of state law defenses will lead to two possible results: either the
arbitration agreement is enforceable, or the arbitration agreement is revoked
in its entirety because of a defense like fraud or duress. But the Supreme Court
in DIRECTV is overly straining and trying to get more mileage out of the
savings clause to go beyond the situation of revocation and instead address
how one should interpret phrases within an arbitration agreement. The text of
the savings clause only discusses grounds for the revocation of any contract;
it was not drafted to micromanage the interpretation of particular terms within
an arbitration contract. The savings clause does not provide interpretive
guidelines or address how courts should interpret particular phrases within an
arbitration agreement. By framing this case as involving the savings clause
and holding that the lower court's interpretation fails to satisfy the savings
saga," "symboliz[ing] what many fans see as the faults of the prequel trilogy," and "the
most annoying film character of all time." Bruce Handy, The Daring Genesis of JJ
Abrams's Star Wars: The Force Awakens, VANITY FAIR, June, 2015.
106 DIRECTV, 136 S. Ct. at 465-66.
107 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2016); DIRECTV, 136 S. Ct. at 465-66.
108 DIRECTV, 136 S. Ct. at 466.
19Id. at 471.
110 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2016).
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clause, the Supreme Court in DIRECTV is creatively amending the savings
clause and in effect replacing the word "revocation" with "interpretation."
Pursuant to the savings clause, arbitration agreements are "valid, irrevocable,
and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract."111 However, after DIRECTV, the Court now
seems to be saying that, under the savings clause, arbitration agreements are
"valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, as long as courts apply such grounds as
exist at law or in equity for the interpretation of any contract."
Just like the Court has been accustomed to doing for the last thirty or forty
years, the Court in DIRECTV judicially amends the FAA and redrafts the
savings clause by creating a demanding equal footing analysis with respect to
the interpretation of phrases within an arbitration clause. Unfortunately, the
FAA's text does not address how a judge should generally interpret phrases
within an arbitration agreement. Interpretation of contract language is
supposed to be addressed by state law, and according to the majority, the states
are the "ultimate authority" in interpretation of contract language. 112 Here's
the new Section 2.5 of the FAA, just recently created by the Court, which
should be added to the text of the statute: "When a court interprets language
within an arbitration clause, it must use the same interpretation it uses for non-
arbitration contracts."
Also, requiring courts to interpret terms "the same way" in both arbitration
and non-arbitration contracts does not fit well with the history of the FAA's
enactment. The FAA statute was designed to remedy a very particular
problem: before the 1920s, courts did not engage in specific performance of
pre-dispute arbitration contracts.1 1 3 As recognized by a House Report, the sole
purpose of the FAA was to reverse the old law and make agreements
enforceable, like any other contract: "Arbitration agreements are purely
matters of contract, and the effect of [the FAA] is simply to make the
contracting party live up to his agreement.""11 4 The focus of the FAA was
simply on the enforceability of an arbitration contract, and the purpose of the
statute was never to demand perfect equality in interpretation of particular
phrases within all types of contracts. Of course, the FAA's enactment does
embody a sense of equality, but equality in terms of enforcement of the
agreement. This notion of equality under the FAA is a much broader, less
heightened idea of equality in the sense that an arbitration agreement would
now be enforceable, as opposed to not enforceable, like any other contract.
111 Id.
112 DIRECTV, 136 S. Ct. at 468.
... See generally MACNEIL, supra note 4; IMRE S. SZALAI, OUTSOURCING JUSTICE: THE
RISE OF MODERN ARBITRATION LAWS IN AMERICA (2013).
114 H.R. Rep. No. 68-96, at 1 (1924).
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However, the FAA's history does not support a more heightened interpretative
standard of word-for-word equality when interpreting phrases within an
arbitration clause and across the board in all types of contracts.
E. Yoda: "Backwards and Hollow DIRECTV's Preemption Standard
Is. Guilty Until Proven Innocent You Are. "
Also, even assuming that the equal footing preemption standard is
reasonable, protects the fundamental attributes of arbitration, and has some
basis in the text and history of the FAA, there is another reason why the
Supreme Court's majority decision is flawed. Under the majority's newly-
created standard of equality of interpretation, courts cannot discriminate
against arbitration when interpreting clauses. Like Yoda with his customary
inversion of word order when he speaks, the majority reverses the normal
order of proof here. What is the proof or evidence of discrimination accepted
by the Court here? DidY you see the proof? The majority pulled another Jedi
Mind Trick, and the proof of discrimination is--drum roll, please-nothing.
The proof of discrimination is a lack of proof of non-discrimination. In
other words, as proof of discrimination, the Court points to a lack of proof of
equal treatment. Repeatedly, the majority stressed that discrimination exists
here because "neither the parties nor the dissent refer us to any contract case
from California or from any other State that interprets similar language to refer
to state laws authoritatively held to be invalid."'1 15 The majority determined
the lower courts engaged in discrimination simply because there was no proof
of lack of discrimination: "nothing in the Court of Appeal's reasoning suggests
that a California court would reach the same interpretation of 'law of your
state' in any context other than arbitration." 116 Also, the majority stated "there
is no other principle invoked by the Court of Appeal that suggests that
California courts would reach the same interpretation of the words 'law of
your state' in other contexts." 117 So, the Court adopts a preemption standard
focusing on whether discrimination occurred, and the proof required to show
discrimination is merely the lack of proof of non-discrimination.
The standard of equal interpretation equality is flawed to begin with in
numerous ways as discussed above, but the standard becomes even more
problematic when considering the proof accepted by the majority regarding
this standard. In effect, the majority adopted a backwards guilty-until-proven-
innocent standard. The standard adopted by the Court breeds mistrust and
"'s DIRECTV, 136 S. Ct. at 469.
116 Id
117 1d at 470.
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presumes discrimination until proven otherwise. Lower courts are presumed
to be hostile and discriminatory against arbitration when interpreting
arbitration phrases, unless the court can prove otherwise by demonstrating
evidence that the court engages in the same interpretations in other, non-
arbitration, contexts.
This standard can easily lead to a conclusion that a court's interpretation
of an arbitration clause is discriminatory and hence preempted because
equality in interpretation across different types of contracts is not likely to
exist. Furthermore, as explained above, arbitration agreements may have
special features or terms, like the selection of an arbitrator, that do not easily
carry over into other contexts. DIRECTV's preemption standard has no basis
in the text or history of the FAA. This new standard, which is deeply flawed
for many reasons to begin with, becomes even more problematic when one
considers the hollow nature of proof used to examine whether the standard is
satisfied-a lack of proof of equal treatment becomes proof that
discrimination exists.
F. Chewbacca: "Holy Sith! The Supreme Court Unbelievably
Screwed Up a Key Citation! "" 8
According to the majority, there is California authority holding that a
contractual reference to state law should be interpreted in a dynamic manner
to incorporate future changes in the law: "California case law itself clarifies
any doubt about how to interpret the language. The California Supreme Court
has held that under 'general contract principles,' references to California law
incorporate the California Legislature's power to change the law
retroactively."119
For this principle, the majority cites a 2013 California Supreme Court
case, Doe v. Harris, which involves the interpretation of some language in a
criminal plea agreement. 120 The DIRECTV majority claims that according to
this California case, a reference in a contract to state law is dynamic, not-static,
and incorporates future changes or amendments to the state law. 121 The
majority misreads Doe v. Harris.
"8 In Chewbacca's native language of Wookie, this section title would read:
"Rrraarrwhhgwwr!!! Aawwwwh, Aarrragghuuhw, huuguughghg... wuuh!" Chewbacca's
grunts and loud howls in Wookie more adequately capture the author's frustrations with
the Supreme Court's flawed opinion than the English translation ever could.
1 9 DIRECTV, 136 S. Ct. at 469.
120 Doe v. Harris, 302 P.3d 598 (Cal. 2013).
121 DIRECTV, 136 S. Ct. at 469.
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Doe v. Harris involved a criminal defendant who entered into a plea
agreement whereby he agreed to abide by a particular state law regarding
registration as a sex offender. 122 At the time of signing the agreement in 1991,
California's sex offender registration law required offenders to be
fingerprinted and photographed, but the information provided by the offender
would not become public record. 123 In 2004, California amended its sex
offender law to make the sex offender's name, address, and photograph
available to the public. 124 The criminal defendant then filed a civil complaint
asserting that it would violate his plea agreement if the new version of the law
applied to him.125 Thus, an issue arose as to whether the criminal defendant
had to abide by the state law as it existed at the time the contract was signed,
or whether the criminal defendant had to abide by the newer, amended version
of the state law.
The California Supreme Court held that the reference to the state law in
the criminal plea agreement was not static and must be interpreted in a
dynamic way to incorporate the new, amended version of the law. 126 The
California Supreme Court reasoned that criminal plea agreements are "infused
with a substantial public interest" and "subject to plenary control by the state,"
and as a result, a contractual reference to state law in this special context of a
plea agreement must be interpreted dynamically for the public good.
127
The California Supreme Court's decision in Doe v. Harris involved the
special setting of criminal plea agreements, but the DIRECTV case does not
involve a criminal plea agreement. The California Supreme Court in Doe v.
Harris, however, did address commercial contracts and recognized that a
different "specific policy" exists in the commercial setting. 128 In the
commercial setting, static interpretations are preferred:
The parties [in a commercial setting] are presumed to have had
existing law in mind when they executed their agreement...; to hold
that subsequent changes in the law which impose greater burdens or
responsibilities upon the parties become part of that agreement would






127 Id. at 602, 603.
12 8Id at 602.
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result in modifying it without their consent, and would promote
uncertainty in commercial transactions.
129
The majority in DIRECTV overlooks Doe's critical distinction between a
criminal plea agreement (where there is a public interest in giving a dynamic
interpretation to state criminal law) and commercial agreements (where there
is a strong interest in giving a static interpretation to avoid uncertainty in
commercial transactions). Doe v. Harris demonstrates that different
interpretive rules can apply in different settings, and this California case
undermines the equal interpretation standard adopted by the majority requiring
the same interpretation in all settings. The majority in DIRECTV claims there
is no proof that California courts would interpret a contractual reference to an
outdated law as an intent to follow the outdated law. 13 0 Yet Doe, the very case
the majority inappropriately miscites, recognizes that static interpretations are
appropriate in commercial contracts.
G. The Force is Strong with These Three: Mattel,
Mastrobuono, and Volt
In holding that the FAA preempts a contract, as correctly and
authoritatively interpreted by the state courts according to state law, the
majority in DIRECTV forgets the primacy of the arbitration agreement in
arbitration law. The majority also suggests it is nonsensical for anyone to agree
to incorporate an invalid, preempted law. 13 1 However, the majority completely
neglects to examine the reasoning of three earlier Supreme Court decisions
which appropriately recognized the primacy of the parties' contract and the
possibility of parties agreeing to be governed by preempted law: Hall Street
Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 132 Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton,
129 Id. at 602 (citation omitted).
130 DIRECTV, 136 S. Ct. at 469 ("Indeed, neither the parties nor the dissent refer us to
any contract case from California or from any other State that interprets similar language
to refer to state laws authoritatively held to be invalid.").
131 Id.
132 552 U.S. 576, 590 (2008) (parties to an arbitration agreement "may contemplate
enforcement under state statutory or common law").
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Inc.,13 3 and Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland
Stanford Jr. University.'
34
About one month after its decision in Preston v. Ferrer, where the Court
held that the FAA's intergalactic preemptive superpowers can displace a
state's carefully-designed administrative scheme, 135 the Court appropriately
acknowledged the critical role of state law in arbitration in Hall StreetAssocs.,
L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc. 136 The FAA provides limited grounds forjudicial vacatur
or modification of arbitration awards, 13 7 and in Mattel, the Court addressed
whether parties can draft arbitration agreements providing for enhanced
judicial review of arbitral awards beyond the FAA's limited grounds for
vacatur or modification. 138 The Court held that §§ 10 and 11 of the FAA
provide the exclusive grounds for vacating or modifying an award under the
FAA.' 39 But the Court in Mattel was very careful to recognize the primacy of
the parties' agreement. The Court explained that the FAA is not the only law
governing arbitration. 140 The Court recognized that parties to an arbitration
agreement, if they so desire, "may contemplate enforcement under state
statutory or common law.... ,141 Therefore, if state statutory or common law
provides for judicial vacatur of arbitral awards on grounds differing from the
FAA, and if parties bargained for application of such state law, the FAA would
not preempt application of state law under these circumstances. But if parties
did not agree to such state law, the FAA would control and prevent application
of the conflicting state law. 142
133 514 U.S. 52, 59 (1995) ("[l]n the absence of contractual intent to the contrary, the
FAA would pre-empt [a state law prohibiting arbitrators from hearing claims for punitive
damages].") (emphasis added).
114 489 U.S. 468, 477 (1989) (the FAA does not preempt state law staying the
enforcement of an arbitration clause "where, as here, the parties have agreed to arbitrate in
accordance with California law").
135 Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 359 (2008).
136 Hall Street Assocs., L.L.C., 552 U.S. at 590.
137 9 U.S.C.A. §§ 10, 11 (West 2002).
13' Hall Street Assocs., L.L. C., 552 U.S. at 578.
139 Id. at 584.
140 Id. at 590.
141 Id.
142 See, e.g., Raymond James Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Honea, 55 So. 3d 1161, 1168 (Ala.
2010) (in light of Mattel, parties may agree under state common law for de novo judicial
review of arbitral awards, which is not allowed under the FAA); Cable Connection, Inc. v.
DirecTV, Inc., 190 P.3d 586, 599 (Cal. 2008) ("[A] reading of the [California Arbitration
Act] that permits the enforcement of agreements for merits review is fully consistent with
the FAA 'policy guaranteeing the enforcement of private contractual arrangements."')
(quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 625
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In Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., the Court also
appropriately recognized the critical, foundational role of the parties'
agreement when addressing the relationship between the FAA and state
law. 143 The state law at issue was New York's Garrity rule, which prohibited
arbitration awards of punitive damages. 144 The Court in Mastrobuono
explained the critical point, missed by the majority in DIRECTV, that the
"FAA's pro-arbitration policy does not operate without regard to the wishes
of the contracting parties," 145 the foundation of all arbitration. As succinctly
stated by the Court in Mastrobuono, "in the absence of contractual intent to
the contrary, the FAA would preempt the Garrity rule." 146 Thus, if parties
bargained for state law to govern, state law would control even if the FAA
would normally make that state law invalid through preemption. The majority
opinion in DIRECTV pretends it is impossible or illogical for anyone to agree
to abide by preempted law, 147 but the Supreme Court's prior FAA cases
properly recognize that parties can agree to preempted law.
In Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Board of Trs. of Leland Stanford Jr. Univ., the
Court addressed the FAA's preemption doctrine where the parties had
bargained for state law to govern the arbitration agreement. 148 Just like in the
DIRECTVcase, a California appellate court in Volt had interpreted the parties'
arbitration agreement to incorporate a state law. 149 This state law was in a
direct, strong, irreconcilable conflict with the FAA. Pursuant to this state law,
if pending litigation existed between a party to an arbitration agreement and a
non-party, a court could stay arbitration so that the related litigation could
(1985)); Hackett v. Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy, 654 N.E.2d 95, 100-01 (N.Y.
1995) (because the FAA's "overriding policy" is "the enforcement of arbitration
agreements according to their terms," and because the parties explicitly chose state law to
govern their arbitration clause, the FAA does not preempt vacatur of an award on state law
grounds of irrationality and public policy, grounds not available under the FAA); cf C &
L Enters., Inc. v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., 532 U.S. 411,419 (2001)
("By selecting Oklahoma law ('the law of the place where the Project is located') to govern
the contract, the parties have effectively consented to confirmation of the award 'in
accordance with' the Oklahoma Uniform Arbitration Act.").
143 Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 56 (1995).
1 Id. at 55 (citing Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 793 (N.Y. 1976)).
4 Mastrobuono, 514 U.S. at 57.
146 Id. at 59 (emphasis added).
147 DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463, 469 (2015) ("Indeed, neither the
parties nor the dissent refer us to any contract case from California or from any other State
that interprets similar language to refer to state laws authoritatively held to be invalid.").
148 Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Board of Trs. of Leland Stanford Jr. Univ., 489 U.S. 468,
479 (1989).
1491d. at 472.
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resolve common questions. 150 Also, pursuant to this state law, if pending
litigation existed between a party to an arbitration agreement and a non-party,
a court could go to a much further extreme and in effect invalidate an
arbitration agreement by "refus[ing] to enforce the arbitration agreement" and
directing all the parties to be joined in the pending litigation and to litigate in
this one proceeding. 151 But the FAA does not directly provide for these
options. Under the FAA, courts must compel arbitration when there is a valid
arbitration agreement, even if related litigation is pending, and the FAA would
not allow a court to refuse to enforce an arbitration agreement and order the
parties to the agreement to litigate their dispute.152 Thus, there was a severe
conflict between the FAA and state law. In reconciling this extreme conflict,
the Court in Volt held that the FAA would not preempt the state law because
the terms of the parties' agreement, as interpreted by the state court, had
incorporated that state law. 153 In holding that state law controlled pursuant to
the bargained-for terms of the parties, the Court recognized the primacy of the
agreement and emphasized the "FAA's primary purpose of ensuring that
private agreements to arbitrate are enforced according to their terms." 
154
Because of the primacy of the parties' agreement, the FAA's core
objective should be respect for the choices of the parties and the enforcement
of their bargained-for arbitration agreements as written. In light of these core
principles, the FAA allows parties to bargain for application of state law as
150 Id. at 471 & n.3.
151 Id. As quoted by the Supreme Court in Volt, the state law at issue, California
Arbitration Act, Cal. Civ. Proc. Code Ann. § 1281.2(c) (1982), provides for the following:
if a court determines that "[a] party to the arbitration agreement is also a party to a pending
court action or special proceeding with a third party, arising out of the same transaction or
series of related transactions and there is a possibility of conflicting rulings on a common
issue of law or fact ... the court (1) may refuse to enforce the arbitration agreement and
may order intervention or joinder of all parties in a single action or special proceeding; (2)
may order intervention or joinder as to all or only certain issues; (3) may order arbitration
among the parties who have agreed to arbitration and stay the pending court action or
special proceeding pending the outcome of the arbitration proceeding; or (4) may stay
arbitration pending the outcome of the court action or special proceeding." Volt, 489 U.S.
at 471 n.3 (emphasis added).
152 See, e.g., Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 218 (1985) (the FAA
"leaves no place for the exercise of discretion by a district court" and requires courts to
enforce arbitration agreements, even if there is the possibility of inefficient, separate
proceedings involving related claims).
153 Volt, 489 U.S. at 477-79.
154
/d. at 479; see also Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52,
65 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("We concluded [in Volt] that even if the FAA pre-
empted the state statute as applied to other parties, the choice-of-law clause in the contract
at issue demonstrated that the parties had agreed to be governed by the statute.").
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part of their arbitration agreement, even if the FAA, absent party choice, would
normally preempt the state law. The majority in DIRECTV neglected to
acknowledge the Court's prior holdings in Mattel, Mastrobuono, and Volt, all
of which respected the foundational rule of arbitration law and recognized the
ability parties to adopt laws that would normally conflict with and be
preempted by the FAA, and the majority pretended that no one would agree to
be governed by invalid or preempted law.
155
IV. TO THE DARK SIDE: THE PRACTICAL IMPACT OF THE SUPREME
COURT'S FLAWED DIRECTVDECISON
The Court's decision, which is flawed on multiple levels, desecrates and
overturns the most fundamental principle of arbitration law-that arbitration
must be based on the agreement of the parties. The Court, engaging in a Jedi
Mind Trick, overrides the intent of the parties, as correctly and authoritatively
interpreted by the state courts. As recognized in dissent, the majority entered
"dangerous" territory with this ruling by overriding the agreement of the
parties. 156 Although not explicit in the dissent, there is a serious constitutional
concern if a court overrides a parties' agreement and forces them to arbitrate
pursuant to manufactured policies of the FAA. Judicial creation of an
obligation to arbitrate on terms not agreed to by the parties would likely run
afoul of the Seventh Amendment right to a jury. 157 The Court is continuing its
fine tradition since the 1980s of grossly erroneous interpretations of the FAA.
Like Anakin Skywalker's transformation into Darth Vader, the Court through
DIRECTV has completed the FAA's transformation into a monster.
Arbitration law, more than ever, is now on the Dark Side. Instead of turning
arbitration law upside down, the Court in DIRECTV should have simply let
the appellate court's decision stand and let DIRECTV live with the
consequences of its own bad drafting.
As described above, DIRECTV sets forth an equal footing interpretation
analysis for FAA preemption. 158 Any interpretation of a phrase within an
arbitration agreement is subject to preemption if the same interpretation does
155 DIRECTV, 136 S. Ct. at 469 ("Indeed, neither the parties nor the dissent refer us to
any contract case from California or from any other State that interprets similar language
to refer to state laws authoritatively held to be invalid.").
156 DIRECTV, 136 S. Ct. at 473.
117 See, e.g., Riggs v. Scrivner, Inc., 927 F.2d 1146, 1148 (10th Cir. 1991)
(compulsory, court-created obligation to engage in binding arbitration violates a plaintiff's
constitutional right to ajury trial).
"' See supra Section II.C.
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not exist in the non-arbitration setting. 159 This equal interpretation analysis is
the technical standard set forth in DIRECTV.
But putting aside the technical standard, here's the practical impact of
DIRECTV. Recall that DIRECTV creates a twisted, backwards presumption of
guilty until proven innocent. 160 A court is presumed to have engaged in a
discriminatory and preempted interpretation of a phrase in an arbitration
clause unless there is proof of interpreting the phrase "in the same way" in
other contract settings.16 1 Practically speaking, if there is an ambiguity in an
arbitration clause, DIRECTV's threat of preemption and guilty-until-proven-
innocent standard will likely push courts to rule in favor of arbitration, to
resolve all ambiguities in an arbitration clause in favor of arbitration. There is
a risk of preemption and overruling by an appellate court if there is not enough
evidence that similar interpretations exist within non-arbitration contracts. But
as mentioned earlier, 162 arbitration terms will not easily be found in other
contractual contexts, so there is likely to be little or no proof of equal
treatment, which in turn is treated as proof of discrimination under this flawed
DIRECTV decision. In sum, even though DIRECTV's technical test is one of
equal footing interpretations with a guilty-until-proven-innocent presumption,
the practical effect of DIRECTVwill be that judges will resolve all ambiguities
within an arbitration agreement in favor of arbitration.
In the wake of its December 2015 DIRECTV decision, the Court in January
2016 GVR'd three related cases from the Hawaii Supreme Court in light of
159 The Supreme Court in D1RECTV reasoned that the FAA preempted the appellate
court's interpretation because "California courts would not interpret contracts other than
arbitration contracts the same way," and "nothing in the Court of Appeal's reasoning
suggests that a California court would reach the same interpretation of 'law of your state'
in any context other than arbitration." DIRECTV, 136 S. Ct. at 469 (emphasis added).
160 See supra Section II.E.
161 The majority repeatedly stressed that discrimination exists here because of the lack
.of proof of non-discrimination. DIRECTV, 136 S. Ct. at 469 ("neither the parties nor the
dissent refer us to any contract case from California or from any other State that interprets
similar language to refer to state laws authoritatively held to be invalid."); id ("nothing in
the Court of Appeal's reasoning suggests that a California court would reach the same
interpretation of 'law of your state' in any context other than arbitration.") (emphasis
added); id. (preemption occurs because "California courts would not interpret contracts
other than arbitration contracts the same way") (emphasis added); id at 470 ("there is no
other principle invoked by the Court of Appeal that suggests that California courts would
reach the same interpretation of the words 'law of your state' in other contexts.").
162 See supra Section I.C.
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DIRECTV.163 "GVR" stands for grant certiorari, vacate, and remand.' 64 If
there is a pending petition for certiorari raising issues that are similar to issues
decided by a recent case, the Supreme Court sometimes summarily GVR's the
pending petitions for reconsideration in light of the new precedent. 165 In
effect, through the three GVRs issued in the wake of DIRECTV, the Supreme
Court granted certiorari in these Hawaii Supreme Court cases, vacated the
judgments, and remanded the cases to the Hawaii Supreme Court so that the
court could reconsider its prior rulings in light of the new equal footing
preemption standard set forth in DIRECTV. Through the GVRs, it appears that
the Supreme Court is signaling to the Hawaii Supreme Court that the FAA
preempts the Hawaii Supreme Court's interpretations of the arbitration clauses
at issue in these cases.
An illustrative Hawaii case involved financial disputes regarding luxury
condos between the developer and purchasers of these condos. 166 The
transaction involved several documents, including purchase agreements that
did not have an arbitration clause and instead had a forum selection clause
requiring litigation in a certain Hawaiian district. 167 In the declaration of the
condominium association, which was another document referenced in the
purchase agreements, there was an arbitration clause. 168 The Hawaii Supreme
Court found there was no obligation to arbitrate. 169 The court interpreted the
conflicting documents as containing an ambiguity regarding dispute
resolution, and hence there was no clear intent to submit disputes to
arbitration.
170
The Supreme Court's GVRs in connection with the Hawaii cases strongly
suggest that, although the Hawaii Supreme Court may have correctly and
authoritatively interpreted the contract terms under Hawaiian law, the FAA
preempts the Hawaii Supreme Court's authoritative interpretation of the
contract. The Hawaii Supreme Court interpreted the documents as involving
an ambiguity because of conflicting dispute resolution provisions. The GVRs
'63Ritz-Carlton Dev. Co. v. Narayan, 136 S. Ct. 800 (2016); Ritz-Carlton Dev. Co. v.
Nath, 136 S. Ct. 799 (2016); Ritz-Carlton Dev. Co. v. Narayan, 136 S. Ct. 799 (2016).
164 See Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, The Supreme Court's Controversial GVRs - and an
Alternative, 107 MICH. L. REV. 711,712 (2009).
165 Id.
16 6Narayan v. Ritz-Carlton Dev. Co., 350 P.3d 995 (Haw. 2015).
167 Id. at 1000.
161 Id. at 999.
16 9 Id. at 1003.
170 Id. ("[W]e hold that the arbitration provision contained in the condominium
declaration is unenforceable because the terms of the various condominium documents are
ambiguous with respect to the Homeowners' intent to arbitrate.").
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suggest that these ambiguities should have been interpreted in favor of an
enforceable obligation to arbitrate. In other words, instead of finding an
ambiguity, the Hawaii Supreme Court should have reconciled the two
seemingly-conflicting dispute resolution provisions, perhaps by fimding a
binding obligation to arbitrate and construing the forum selection clause more
narrowly. Under a narrow interpretation, the forum selection clause may only
address where arbitration-related court proceedings, like motions to confirm
or vacate arbitral awards, must occur.
1 7 1
The DIRECTV GVRs suggest other hypotheticals where the FAA would
preempt lower courts' interpretations. For example, in the employment
context, sometimes an arbitration clause purporting to be binding appears in
an employee handbook, which contains a seemingly conflicting disclaimer
that the handbook is not an employment contract and creates no contractual
obligations. In the past, some courts might have found that the ambiguity
renders the arbitration clause unenforceable. 172 However, the practical effect
of DIRECTV is that the FAA could easily preempt such an interpretation under
state law, unless there is evidence that courts would interpret the language in
the same way in non-arbitration settings.
Any time there is an ambiguity in the terms of an arbitration clause, there
is a risk of preemption unless there is evidence that courts interpret the
language in the same way in non-arbitration contracts. Consider an arbitration
clause that generally incorporates the rules of an arbitration provider, like the
American Arbitration Association, which generally grants arbitrators broad
discretion to control and permit discovery in connection with an arbitration
proceeding. Further suppose that the arbitration clause states the following:
"Each party shall have the right to take the deposition of one fact witness."
171 On remand, the Hawaii Supreme Court will technically have to apply the equal
footing preemption analysis and examine whether other courts would have engaged in the
same interpretative analysis in other non-arbitration settings. DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia,
136 S. Ct. 463, 469 (2015) (finding preemption because "nothing in the Court of Appeal's
reasoning suggests that a California court would reach the same interpretation of 'law of
your state" in any context other than arbitration.") (emphasis added). DIRECTV's
preemption standard uses a guilty-until-proven-innocent presumption, and the lack of
proof of equal treatment in non-arbitration settings would give rise to a finding of
discrimination and hence preemption. As explained above, supra Section II.C, requiring
equality in interpretation of contractual terms between arbitration and non-arbitration
contracts is unreasonable because arbitration agreements have certain unique features that
do not easily carry over into other contexts.
172 See, e.g., Sparks v. Vista Del Mar Child & Family Servs., 145 Cal. Rep. 3d 318
(Cal. Ct. App. 2012); Salazar v. Citadel Commc'ns Corp., 90 P.3d 466 (N.M. 2004)
(finding arbitration clause in employee handbook unenforceable because handbook
included disclaimer that the handbook is not a contract).
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There is a possible ambiguity here. Does this one deposition clause limit all
discovery just to one witness, and thus this one deposition clause acts as a ban
or ceiling on discovery and limits the arbitrator's authority? Or does the one
deposition clause serve merely as a floor or guarantee that the parties will have
at least one deposition, in addition to any other discovery within the
arbitrator's discretion? A judge may interpret this one deposition clause to
operate as a harsh ceiling-as a ban on discovery-and under such an
interpretation, a court may find that the arbitration clause is substantively
unconscionable and unenforceable.173 However, the drafting party wishing to
enforce the clause will argue that DIRECTV's equal interpretation test
preempts this interpretation. Why? Because we assume the court was guilty
until proven innocent, and there is no similar interpretation of this language in
the non-arbitration setting. In effect, ambiguities in interpreting any phrase
within an arbitration agreement are now resolved in favor of arbitration.
In many situations, the practical impact of DIRECTV's equal footing
preemption standard, which will have the effect of resolving all ambiguities in
interpretation of any phrase in an arbitration clause in favor of arbitration, will
undercut the traditional contract law principle of contra proferentem that
ambiguities should be resolved against the drafter. 174 If an employer or
corporation drafts an arbitration clause in an employee or consumer contract
and the clause has an ambiguous term, the ambiguity should be resolved
against the drafter under traditional contract law principles. However,
DIRECTV's new preemption standard appears to reverse this principle by
encouraging courts to resolve all ambiguities in favor of arbitration.
Considering the broader potential impact of DIRECTV and how it could
encourage courts to resolve all ambiguities in favor of arbitration, DIRECTV
contributes to increased judicial rubberstamping of arbitration agreements,
which is a broader trend over the past years. With the Court's ruling in
American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant that the effective
vindication doctrine is mere dicta, 175 the Court's ruling in Rent-A-Center,
West, Inc. v. Jackson, that delegation clauses are fully enforceable so that
arbitrators can resolve all arguments about the enforceability of arbitration
173 See, e.g., Reid v. Optumhealth Care Solutions, Inc., No. 3:12-cv-00747-ST, 2012
WL 6738542, at *8 (D. Or. Oct. 11, 2012) (holding that a two-day limit for fact witness
depositions and one-day limit for expert witness depositions are substantively
unconscionable in connection with an employment dispute); Ontiveros v. DHL Express
(USA), Inc., 79 Cal. Rep. 3d 471 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008); Hamrick v. Aqua Glass, Inc.,
No. 07-3089-CL, 2008 WL 2853992 (D. Or. Feb. 20, 2008).
" Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 206.
175 American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2310 (2013).
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clauses, 176 the Court's ruling in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion that
preempts state law defenses undermining the fundamental attributes of
arbitration, 177 and now DIRECTV's extremely flawed equal footing
preemption standard, the Supreme Court has been insulating arbitration
agreements from attack. The legal system is inching closer and closer to a
model of pure judicial rubberstamping of arbitration agreements.
Why isjudicial rubberstamping of arbitration clauses problematic? Some,
but not all, of the stronger parties in the consumer and employee context are
overreaching by drafting unfair procedures or terms in arbitration clauses, in
an attempt to slant the odds in the stronger parties' favor. The combined effect
of recent Supreme Court decisions like DIRECTV is that it is harder for courts
to monitor, review, and strike down unfair arbitration procedures. The FAA
was never intended or designed to cover the small disputes of consumers and
employees.178 The Supreme Court is making it harder to monitor arbitration
clauses for fairness in situations where the stronger party can take advantage
of the weaker party. With an arbitration contract between two sophisticated
commercial parties to cover their contract disputes, I am comfortable with all
the pro-arbitration presumptions and standards in the world. But with respect
to consumers and employees, as demonstrated by the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau study from 2015, there is often little to no meaningful
understanding of the significance of an arbitration clause.179 Because of the
widespread use of arbitration in consumer and employee contracts and the lack
of meaningful consent in such settings, as well as the impact of arbitration
clauses, which can completely shut someone out of the formal civil legal
system with its constitutional protections, courts should be more protective of
employees and consumers.
176 Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 72 (2010). See, e.g., Lloyd v.
BRSI, LLC, No. CV- 15-964-M, 2016 WL 234861 (W.D. Okla. Jan. 19, 2016) (relying
on Rent-A-Center to compel arbitration and to direct arbitrator to rule on any challenges to
the enforcement of the arbitration clause).
177 AT&T Mobility LLC. v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 341 (2011).
178 See generally IMRE S. SZALAI, OUTSOURCING JUSTICE: THE RISE OF MODERN
ARBITRATION LAWS IN AMERICA (2013).
179 CFPB, Arbitration Study, Report to Congress, Pursuant to Dodd-Frank Wall Street
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VI. CONCLUSION: IN A GALAXY NOT Too FAR AWAY?
In conclusion, the Supreme Court's decision in DIRECTVis deeply flawed
and turns arbitration law upside down. I hope that more federal agencies, like
the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and the Federal Communications
Commission, with their current initiatives to regulate arbitration clauses,
180
can follow the path of the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services and enact
rules that are more protective of consumers, 181 and perhaps Congress may
eventually step in to limit or regulate the broad use of arbitration in American
society. The Court has completely gone to the Dark Side with its grossly
erroneous interpretations of the FAA.
80 Arbitration Agreements, 81 Fed. Reg. 32829 (proposed May 24, 2016). See John
Eggerton, Mandatory Arbitration Clauses Not Prohibited in FCC Privacy Order,
BROADCASTING & CABLE, Oct. 27, 2016,
http://www.broadcastingcable.com/news/washington/mandatory-arbitration-clauses-not-
prohibited-fcc-privacy-order/i 60716 (the Federal Communications Commission is
preparing to engage in rulemaking regarding arbitration).
181 42 CFR § 483.70 (2016) (banning pre-dispute arbitration agreements in nursing
home contracts).
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